Showing posts with label compromise. Show all posts
Showing posts with label compromise. Show all posts

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Compromise?

OK, let me apologize for sounding condescending. I actually was attempting
to sound confused that you didn't realize what you did. Yeah, it sounds
condescending in hindsight, but it really wasn't meant to.
No, I do not think it is acceptable behavior, especially in light of our
company's attempts to get more secure. That's why we're changing the default
to require a strong password. As others have stated, that's generally the
way this market has behaved in the past so it really hasn't seemed like a
big deal. With all the worms and viruses hitting us though, that has
changed.
Going back and modifying the released version of the software is a pretty
difficult operation, from what I understand. We have done that for the
Slammer fix, but apparently this hasn't made that bar as you've suggested it
should. It will be done for Yukon, however, so hopefully there is some light
at the end of the tunnel.
Again, I'd like to apologize for my incredibly bad choice of phrasing...
Sincerely,
Stephen Dybing
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.
Please reply to the newsgroups only, thanks.
"phil" <anonymous@.discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message
news:059201c3b933$9a9f55f0$a301280a@.phx.gbl...
Let me say this, anyone who starts a sentence with "Uh,
." means their remarks to be condescending, and so I will
respond to that attitude...
I will gladly accept blame for leaving the front door
open, as you say. Perhaps you can take partial blame for
advertising that I have the type of house that just might
leave the front door open. Or one that has a default
lock that doesn't work.
You actually think its acceptable behavior that a product
installed on an operating system can be set in a default
mode whereas others can use it to launch any process, at
will, to attack one's machine? And so you might
ask, "Well, what could Microsoft have done?". Well I
have just such an answer:
1. It should have replaced SQL Server 2000 will a
revised version including all patches in SP3a, not just
made the patches available and advised customers to
install it.
2. And it should have included a revision making it
impossible to set a blank password.
Yes, call me stupid or nave (as you so implied), but no
more stupid than a manufacturer who set up their
customers for just such a failure, fails to correct it in
an acceptable way, and then tells the customer its his
fault.
I love the arrogance of your response; somehow I would
guess Mr. Balmer or Mr. Gates might find your arrogance
equally amusing.
quote:

>--Original Message--
>Uh, why the vulnerability exists? It exists because you

left the front door
quote:

>open. In the past, it was the default account/password

combination when SQL
quote:

>Server was installed and if your SQL Server is running

under a local
quote:

>administrator account, you just gave anybody who has a

SQL Server client
quote:

>tool complete control over that computer. There was a

worm that hit a while
quote:

>back that simply scanned every machine it could find

looking for SQL Servers
quote:

>with no password on their SA account. The only way to

keep you from shooting
quote:

>yourself in the foot is by disallowing blank SA

passwords. We're doing our
quote:

>best to keep you from doing that in the current

versions, but we cannot
quote:

>remove that ability completely without breaking lots of

existing
quote:

>applications. What we can do is warn you not to allow it

and disable it by
quote:

>default so that you consciously have to allow the

vulnerability to exist. I
quote:

>believe that's what we started doing with SQL Server

2000 service pack 3.
quote:

>--
>I hope this makes sense,
>Stephen Dybing
>This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and

confers no rights.
quote:

>Please reply to the newsgroups only, thanks.
>"phil b" <g3@.philbeisel.com> wrote in message
>news:017301c3b90a$371e25c0$a401280a@.phx.gbl...
has[QUOTE]
is[QUOTE]
my[QUOTE]
one[QUOTE]
in[QUOTE]
servers[QUOTE]
running[QUOTE]
called[QUOTE]
these[QUOTE]
as[QUOTE]
development[QUOTE]
but[QUOTE]
ran[QUOTE]
the[QUOTE]
MS[QUOTE]
and[QUOTE]
>
>.
>
thanks, i appreciate your response. apology accepted.
one question lingers that seems to have been lost in all=20
of this:
can you tell me if a blank password "sa" account, with=20
SP3a installed and otherwise default settings, is known=20
to Microsoft to be able to be hijacked and run a process?=20
in other words, I don't understand what this "feature" is=20
(meaning the ability to launch some process) and whether=20
it is a feature to begin with.
that's really what i wanted to know. the damage is done,=20
i'm in clean up mode, and i decided to write in case i=20
had discovered some new flaw.
(i suppose that's why i took immediate offense, because i=20
was only interested in informing Microsoft of a new=20
potential flaw if it wasn't known already).
thanks,
phil
quote:

>--Original Message--
>OK, let me apologize for sounding condescending. I=20

actually was attempting
quote:

>to sound confused that you didn't realize what you did.=20

Yeah, it sounds
quote:

>condescending in hindsight, but it really wasn't meant=20

to.
quote:

>No, I do not think it is acceptable behavior, especially=20

in light of our
quote:

>company's attempts to get more secure. That's why we're=20

changing the default
quote:

>to require a strong password. As others have stated,=20

that's generally the
quote:

>way this market has behaved in the past so it really=20

hasn't seemed like a
quote:

>big deal. With all the worms and viruses hitting us=20

though, that has
quote:

>changed.
>Going back and modifying the released version of the=20

software is a pretty
quote:

>difficult operation, from what I understand. We have=20

done that for the
quote:

>Slammer fix, but apparently this hasn't made that bar as=20

you've suggested it
quote:

>should. It will be done for Yukon, however, so hopefully=20

there is some light
quote:

>at the end of the tunnel.
>Again, I'd like to apologize for my incredibly bad=20

choice of phrasing...
quote:

>--=20
>Sincerely,
>Stephen Dybing
>This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and=20

confers no rights.
quote:

>Please reply to the newsgroups only, thanks.
>"phil" <anonymous@.discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in=20

message
quote:

>news:059201c3b933$9a9f55f0$a301280a@.phx.gbl...
>Let me say this, anyone who starts a sentence with "Uh,
>.." means their remarks to be condescending, and so I=20

will
quote:

>respond to that attitude...
>I will gladly accept blame for leaving the front door
>open, as you say. Perhaps you can take partial blame for
>advertising that I have the type of house that just might
>leave the front door open. Or one that has a default
>lock that doesn't work.
>You actually think its acceptable behavior that a product
>installed on an operating system can be set in a default
>mode whereas others can use it to launch any process, at
>will, to attack one's machine? And so you might
>ask, "Well, what could Microsoft have done?". Well I
>have just such an answer:
>1. It should have replaced SQL Server 2000 will a
>revised version including all patches in SP3a, not just
>made the patches available and advised customers to
>install it.
>2. And it should have included a revision making it
>impossible to set a blank password.
>Yes, call me stupid or na=EFve (as you so implied), but no
>more stupid than a manufacturer who set up their
>customers for just such a failure, fails to correct it in
>an acceptable way, and then tells the customer its his
>fault.
>I love the arrogance of your response; somehow I would
>guess Mr. Balmer or Mr. Gates might find your arrogance
>equally amusing.
>
>left the front door
>combination when SQL
>under a local
>SQL Server client
>worm that hit a while
>looking for SQL Servers
>keep you from shooting
>passwords. We're doing our
>versions, but we cannot
>existing
>and disable it by
>vulnerability to exist. I
>2000 service pack 3.
>confers no rights.
be[QUOTE]
>has
vunerablity[QUOTE]
but[QUOTE]
>is
public[QUOTE]
my[QUOTE]
>my
>one
>in
>servers
>running
>called
>these
on[QUOTE]
>as
>development
>but
was[QUOTE]
>ran
ports[QUOTE]
>the
>MS
>and
>
>.
>
|||Stephen, thanks. i guess all I have left to say on this=20
is simply: wow!
/phil
quote:

>--Original Message--
>Yes, if you don't provide a password on your SA account,=20

anybody able to run
quote:

>"OSQL /Usa /P /S<servername>" (or any other client=20

program of their choice)
quote:

>and connect now has complete control over your SQL=20

Server. And on top of
quote:

>that, that person now has whatever permissions that the=20

account running SQL
quote:

>Server has (because of xp_cmdshell). If it's a local=20

admin, they have
quote:

>complete control over the box. If it's a domain admin,=20

they have complete
quote:

>control over your domain. If it's a domain or local=20

account, they have
quote:

>whatever permission that account has.
>As you have surmised, this is a really big deal.
>--=20
>Sincerely,
>Stephen Dybing
>This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and=20

confers no rights.
quote:

>Please reply to the newsgroups only, thanks.
>"phil b" <anonymous@.discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in=20

message
quote:

>news:018d01c3b9da$6ecf6300$a501280a@.phx.gbl...
>thanks, i appreciate your response. apology accepted.
>one question lingers that seems to have been lost in all
>of this:
>can you tell me if a blank password "sa" account, with
>SP3a installed and otherwise default settings, is known
>to Microsoft to be able to be hijacked and run a process?
>in other words, I don't understand what this "feature" is
>(meaning the ability to launch some process) and whether
>it is a feature to begin with.
>that's really what i wanted to know. the damage is done,
>i'm in clean up mode, and i decided to write in case i
>had discovered some new flaw.
>(i suppose that's why i took immediate offense, because i
>was only interested in informing Microsoft of a new
>potential flaw if it wasn't known already).
>thanks,
>phil
>
>actually was attempting
>Yeah, it sounds
>to.
>in light of our
>changing the default
>that's generally the
>hasn't seemed like a
>though, that has
>software is a pretty
>done that for the
>you've suggested it
>there is some light
>choice of phrasing...
>confers no rights.
>message
>will
for[QUOTE]
might[QUOTE]
product[QUOTE]
in[QUOTE]
it[QUOTE]
and[QUOTE]
>be
you[QUOTE]
>vunerablity
>but
>public
the[QUOTE]
>my
infected[QUOTE]
was[QUOTE]
>on
an[QUOTE]
terminate[QUOTE]
in[QUOTE]
IIS[QUOTE]
>was
>ports
were[QUOTE]
by[QUOTE]
the[QUOTE]
>
>.
>
sqlsql

Compromise?

OK, I guess there's more stuff to look for. Of the list
that you mentioned in the last thread, I did find nc.exe
but no others. There were two versions, one in System32
from about a year ago but the other was in a subfolder
and was dated recently.
I'm embarrassed about my complete lack of SQL knowledge
(I shouldn't be because I never agreed to support it.)
but let me say this....
Please tell me that there IS supposed to be a "sql_admin"
local Windows account and that it IS supposed to be in
the local Administrators group.
quote:

>--Original Message--
>Charlie-
>glad this helped.
>another idea:
>do a find on all files created since your SQL install. i
>did this and found about 1,200 new files, however, the
>list was fairly easy to scan. the results were

revealing:
quote:

>1. some .exe files ended up in my windows\system32
>directory (previously i mentioned c:\winnt\... but this
>was not even where my system directory was so it was

very
quote:

>easy to spot this as a 'fake').
>i found:
>08/06/2000 01:51 AM 32,830 dbmsshrn.dll
>11/29/2003 03:38 PM 2,008 evntmanager.vxd
>11/24/2003 03:36 PM 126,976 fport.exe
>08/06/2000 01:50 AM 36,939 insrepim.exe
>07/07/2000 12:20 PM 81,920 mdt2fw95.dll
>11/29/2003 03:38 PM 548

msjet40enginev2.vxd
quote:

>11/30/2003 09:42 AM 1,161 msman32_1.dll
>11/30/2003 09:29 AM 937,984 msmantrt32.dll
>12/17/2002 05:24 PM 188,988 msrpjt40.dll
>08/06/2000 01:51 AM 274,489 ntwdblib.dll
>11/29/2003 08:29 AM 27,136 pskill.exe
>11/29/2003 08:30 AM 359,936 radv.exe
>11/29/2003 08:31 AM 130,048 rar.exe
>11/24/2003 03:36 PM 35,898 till.exe
>11/24/2003 03:36 PM 45,056 tk.exe
>of i which i think are placed by the "virus".
>2. a ton of data files in c: d: or e: (drives on my
>machine) hiding out in RECYCLER\_ many had .ra*
>extensions. they appeared to be names of popular DVD's
>and that my machine was hijacked to process or share

with
quote:

>other. these files took up GB's of space.
>/phil
>
>you
>looking
be[QUOTE]
vunerablity[QUOTE]
but[QUOTE]
>is
public[QUOTE]
my[QUOTE]
>running
>called
>these
on[QUOTE]
>but
was[QUOTE]
>ran
ports[QUOTE]
>MS
>.
>
Hi Charlie,
Please check the logon account configured for SQL Server. I suspect the
individual that installed SQL Server created an account called SQL_Admin
and configured SQL Server and possibly SQL Agent to use this account.
You can check this in two places. One is SQL Enterprise Manager.
Highlight the server name, right click and select properties. Then, select
the security tab. That will display among other items the account used for
the SQL Server service.
To check the account for SQL Agent, open the Mangement folder for the
server, highlight SQL Agent. Right click and select properties. You will
be able to see the account used for the SQL Agent service in that area.
Of course, you can check the credentials in the Services area of Computer
Management as well. It is recommended that if you change the account
and/or password, that you do it through SQL Enterprise Manager.
Under the concept of least privilege, you will want to take that account
out of the Administrators group for the Windows server.
Thanks.
Gary
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.|||I have already checked in Services (sticking with what I
am very familiar with) and yes, those 2 SQL related
services are running under the sql_admin account.
From what you are saying, that account does not have to
be in the local Administrators group or in any other
group (besides Users, of course). Is that correct?
As for the person who set up the account and
installed/configured SQL - Got me! Therein lies the
problem. Many faculty members get tech resources without
support. I believe a student who is no longer around set
it up! Ahh, the joys of Academic IT.
quote:

>--Original Message--
>Hi Charlie,
>Please check the logon account configured for SQL

Server. I suspect the
quote:

>individual that installed SQL Server created an account

called SQL_Admin
quote:

>and configured SQL Server and possibly SQL Agent to use

this account.
quote:

>You can check this in two places. One is SQL Enterprise

Manager.
quote:

>Highlight the server name, right click and select

properties. Then, select
quote:

>the security tab. That will display among other items

the account used for
quote:

>the SQL Server service.
>To check the account for SQL Agent, open the Mangement

folder for the
quote:

>server, highlight SQL Agent. Right click and select

properties. You will
quote:

>be able to see the account used for the SQL Agent

service in that area.
quote:

>Of course, you can check the credentials in the Services

area of Computer
quote:

>Management as well. It is recommended that if you

change the account
quote:

>and/or password, that you do it through SQL Enterprise

Manager.
quote:

>Under the concept of least privilege, you will want to

take that account
quote:

>out of the Administrators group for the Windows server.
>Thanks.
>Gary
>This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and

confers no rights.
quote:

>.
>
|||The service account will automatically be granted rights if it's assigned
with Enterprise Manager. The rights needed by the service account are
documented in this KB article:
http://support.microsoft.com/defaul...b;en-us;Q283811
Richard Waymire, MCSE, MCDBA
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.
"Charlie" <anonymous@.discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in message
news:024d01c3ba8d$4d274480$a101280a@.phx.gbl...[QUOTE]
> I have already checked in Services (sticking with what I
> am very familiar with) and yes, those 2 SQL related
> services are running under the sql_admin account.
> From what you are saying, that account does not have to
> be in the local Administrators group or in any other
> group (besides Users, of course). Is that correct?
> As for the person who set up the account and
> installed/configured SQL - Got me! Therein lies the
> problem. Many faculty members get tech resources without
> support. I believe a student who is no longer around set
> it up! Ahh, the joys of Academic IT.
>
> Server. I suspect the
> called SQL_Admin
> this account.
> Manager.
> properties. Then, select
> the account used for
> folder for the
> properties. You will
> service in that area.
> area of Computer
> change the account
> Manager.
> take that account
> confers no rights.|||Hi Charlie,
I reviewed the threads on this post today and realized a lot of ground has
been covered. I would like to summarize the issue if I may.
1. Your initial request concerned a question about multiple random TCP
ports on your server in communication with an external server via TCP port
1433. You were seeking help to determine if the box had been compromised.
2. Based on this information and additional information about files
located on the server, there is a chance the box has indeed been
compromised.
3. Your action at this time will depend on your objective. If you desire
to conduct a forensics examination on the server, you may want to consult
the information outlined at http://www.cert.org/nav/index_red.html in the
fixes section.
4. The following items specific to SQL Server configuration have been
discussed.
A. The 'SA' account must be secured with a very strong password.
B. The server should be shielded from the Internet by a firewall.
Specifically, TCP port 1433 should be closed for incoming packets from the
Internet.
C. Client/server communication with SQL Server is handled via incoming
packets to SQL over TCP port 1433 and outgoing packets to the clients on
one of the ports in the range 1024 to 5000. The specific port is
determined when the client connects.
D. The logon credentials for the SQL Server and SQL Agent accounts should
not be a member of the Administrators group on the server nor should they
be members of the Domain Admin group.
5. In the event you rebuild the server, SQL Server 2000 should be upgraded
to Service Pack 3a. A post SP3 security patch for SQL Server, MS03-031
should be applied. I also recommend applying MS03-033 which is a patch for
MDAC 2.7 SP1. When you upgrade SQL Server 2000 with SP3, MDAC 2.7 SP1 is
applied automatically.
6. In the event you rebuild the Windows server, please apply the
applicable Service Packs and security updates before placing the server on
the network and certainly before placing it on the Internet. The Windows
Update web site is very useful for cataloging the updates needed for a
specific build of the operating system. Also, the Microsoft Baseline
Security Analyzer is a useful tool to help you determine the patches and
configurations appropriate for your server. MBSA is available at
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/...e63b-92e3-4f97-
80e7-8bc9ff836742&DisplayLang=en.
7. You may want to download the updated SQL Server Books On LIne. It has
been updated for SP3. This can be installed as a separate package. It is
availble at
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/...71A6-BCF4-45A6-
A2E2-F6AB5BE3EF12&displaylang=en. SQL Server Books On Line is a very
useful repository of information about SQL Server.
Thank you for using the Microsoft newsgroups as your source for technical
information. In this particular case the complexity of your issue will
require in-depth troubleshooting and will not be best served by newsgroup
support. Please go to;
http://support.microsoft.com/common...=fh;en-us;cntac
tms
Select your region from the map and follow the instructions for contacting
our telephone support centers in your area.
Thank you.
Gary Whitley
This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.